Ruling Request; U.S. International Trade Commission; Limited Exclusion Order; Investigation No. 337-TA-1368; Certain Vaporizer Devices, Cartridges Used with Therewith, and Components Thereof

H358516
April 22, 2026
OT:RR:BSTC:EOE H358516 RLP
CATEGORY: 19 U.S.C. § 1337; Unfair Competition Paul M. Schoenhard McGuireWoods LLP 888 16th Street NW Washington, DC 20006 VIA EMAIL: [email protected] RE: Ruling Request; U.S. International Trade Commission; Limited Exclusion Order; Investigation No. 337-TA-1368; Certain Vaporizer Devices, Cartridges Used with Therewith, and Components Thereof Dear Mr. Schoenhard: Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. Part 177, the Exclusion Order Enforcement Branch (“EOE Branch”), Regulations and Rulings, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), issues this administrative ruling in response to the request from NJOY LLC, NJOY Holdings, Inc., Altria Group, Inc., Altria Group Distribution Company, and Altria Client Services LLC (collectively “NJOY”), dated December 3, 2025, which includes Exhibits 1 to 14 (collectively, the “Ruling Request”). We find that NJOY has established, through this inter partes proceeding, that its modified vaporizer devices and cartridges used with those devices (the “New NJOY ACE”) is not subject to exclusion from entry based on the limited exclusion order (“1368 LEO”) that the U.S. International Trade Commission (“Commission” or “ITC”) issued in Investigation No. 337-TA-1368 (“the underlying investigation” or “the 1368 investigation”), pursuant to section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (“section 337”) unless and until this ruling letter is revoked or modified pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 177.12. We further note that determinations of the Commission resulting from the underlying investigation or a related proceeding under 19 C.F.R. Part 210 are binding authority on CBP and, in the case of conflict, will by operation of law modify or revoke any contrary CBP ruling or decision pertaining to section 337 exclusion orders. As noted above, this ruling letter is the result of a request for an administrative ruling from CBP under 19 C.F.R. Part 177, which was conducted on an inter partes basis. The process involves the parties with a direct and demonstrable interest in the question presented by the ruling request: (1) your client, NJOY, the ruling requester and respondent in the 1368 investigation; and (2) JUUL Labs, Inc. (“JLI”), complainant in the 1368 investigation. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 177.1(c).

The EOE branch asked the parties to clearly identify confidential information, including information subject to the administrative protective order in the underlying investigation, with [[red brackets]] in all of their submissions to CBP. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 177.2; 177.8. If this ruling letter includes additional information not currently bracketed in red [[ ]] that either party believes constitutes confidential information and that should be redacted from the published ruling, then the parties should contact CBP within ten (10) working days of the date of this ruling letter. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 177.8(a)(3). Please note that disclosure of information related to administrative rulings under 19 C.F.R. Part 177 is governed by, for example, 6 C.F.R. Part 5, 31 C.F.R. Part 1, 19 C.F.R. Part 103, and 19 C.F.R. § 177.8(a)(3). See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(a). In addition, CBP is guided by the laws relating to confidentiality and disclosure, such as the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), as amended (5 U.S.C. § 552), the Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. § 1905), and the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended (5 U.S.C. § 552a). A request for confidential treatment of information submitted in connection with a ruling requested under 19 C.F.R. Part 177 faces a strong presumption in favor of disclosure. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 177.8(a)(3). The person seeking this treatment must overcome that presumption with a request that is appropriately tailored and supported by evidence establishing that: the information in question is customarily kept private or closely-held and either that the government provided an express or implied assurance of confidentiality when the information was shared with the government or there were no express or implied indications at the time the information was submitted that the government would publicly disclose the information. See Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2366 (2019) (concluding that “[a]t least where commercial or financial information is both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an assurance of privacy, the information is ‘confidential’ within the meaning of exemption 4.”); see also U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Information Policy: Step-by-Step Guide for Determining if Commercial or Financial Information Obtained from a Person is Confidential Under Exemption 4 of the FOIA (updated 10/7/2019). I. BACKGROUND A. ITC Investigation No. 337-TA-1368 1. Procedural History at the ITC The Commission instituted Investigation No. 337-TA-1368 on August 7, 2023, based on a complaint filed by JLI. Certain Vaporizer Devices, Cartridges Used Therewith, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1368, EDIS Doc. ID 843889, Public Commission Opinion (Feb. 19, 2025) at 5 citing 88 Fed. Reg. 52207 (Aug. 7, 2023) (“Commission Opinion”). The complaint alleged a violation of section 337 by reason of infringement of certain claims of the 11,134,722 patent (the ’722 patent), the 11,606,981 patent (the ’981 patent), the 10,709,173 patent (the ’173 patent), the 10,130,123 (the ’123 patent), and the RE49,114 patent (“the ’114 patent”). Id. The notice of investigation named NJOY as the respondent. Id. at 2. The Commission’s Office of Unfair Import Investigations (“OUII”) was also named as a party in the investigation. Id. 2

On August 23, 2024, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued the final initial determination (“FID”) finding a violation of section 337. Id. at 7. Specifically, the ALJ determined that a violation of section 337 occurred in the importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after importation, of the accused products that infringed claims 1 and 15 of the ’722 patent, claims 1 and 8 of the ’981 patent, claims 1 and 4 of the ’173 patent, and claims 27 and 32 of the ’123 patent, but these products were found not to infringe the ’144 patent. Id. at 6-8. On October 24, 2024, the Commission issued a notice in which it determined to review the FID in part and requested submissions responding to the selected issues under review and on remedy, the public interest, and bonding. Id. at 10 citing 89 Fed. Reg. 89042. The Commission, in its review of the FID, found a violation of section 337 as to claims 1 and 15 of the ’722 patent, claims 1 and 8 of the ’981 patent, claims 1 and 4 of the ’173 patent, and claims 27 and 32 of the ’123 patent. Id. at 136. The Commission determined that the appropriate remedy was a limited exclusion order directed at NJOY. Id. In the limited exclusion order, the Commission ordered that “[c]ertain vaporizer devices, cartridges used therewith, and components thereof that infringe one or more of claims 1 and 15 of the ’722 patent, claims 1 and 8 of the ’981 patent, claims 27 and 32 of the ’123 patent, and claims 1 and 4 of the ’173 patent…a re excluded from entry for consumption into the United States, entry for consumption from a foreign-trade zone, or withdrawal from a warehouse for consumption, for the remaining terms of the Asserted Patents, except under license from, or with the permission of, the patent owner or as provided by law.” Certain Vaporizer Devices, Cartridges Used Therewith, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1368, EDIS Doc. ID 841098, Limited Exclusion Order (Jan. 29, 2025) at 2, ¶ 1. 2. The Patent Claims in the 1368 LEO The 1368 LEO prohibits the unlicensed entry for consumption of certain vaporizer devices, cartridges used therewith, and components thereof that infringe one or more of claims 1 and 15 of the ’722 patent, claims 1 and 8 of the ’981 patent, claims 1 and 4 of the ’173 patent, and claims 27 and 32 of the ’123 patent that are manufactured abroad by, or on behalf of, or imported by or on behalf of, NJOY, or any of its affiliated companies, parents, subsidiaries, or other related business entities, or their successors or assigns. See 1368 LEO at 1-2. The FID describes the ‘722 and ‘981 patents together because they “have nearly identical specifications.” Certain Vaporizer Devices, Cartridges Used Therewith, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-1368, EDIS Doc. ID 832493, Initial Determination on Violation of Section 337 and Recommended Determination on Remedy and Bond (Aug. 23, 2024) at 14. According to the Commission, the ‘722 and ‘981 patents: relate to reusable electronic cigarettes or vaporizers containing a battery portion and a cartomizer. Vaporizers or reusable electronic cigarettes are typically separated into a battery and a cartomizer, to allow the disposal and replacement of a nicotine containing fluid cartomizer while preserving the more costly battery and associated circuitry (microcontroller, switch, indicating LED, etc.) for additional 3

use. The vaporizer may include a shell containing the battery segment and cartomizer receiving segment, with a chamber formed in the cartomizer receiving segment to receive the cartomizer. The cartomizer contains the vaporizable substance, heating element, electrical contacts, and mouthpiece. Id. at 4 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). Similarly, the ’173 patent “relates to ‘apparatuses, including systems and devices, for vaporizing material to form inhalable aerosol’” which “may include, among other things, a cartridge, a mouthpiece, a heater/vaporizer, and a storage compartment to hold the vaporizable material.” Id. at 8 citing ’173 patent at 2:37-39; 2:51-55. Finally, the ’123 patent “relates generally to distinguishing between blowing (exhaling) and drawing (inhaling) in vaporizer devices.” FID at 7 citing ’123 patent at 2:15-19. a. Claims 1 and 15 of the ’722 Patent The ’722 patent is titled “Vaporizer.” Id. at 4 citing ’722 patent. Both claims 1 and 15 of the ’722 patent are independent. Id. at 14. Claims 1 and 15 of the ’722 patent are reproduced below: 1. [pre] A vaporizer comprising: [a] a battery portion comprising a battery housing segment and a cartomizer receiving segment, [b] the cartomizer receiving segment defining a chamber having an insertion end distal from the battery housing segment and a base end proximate to the battery housing segment, [c] the battery portion further comprising a plurality of charger electrical contacts to provide electrical charge to a battery housed in the battery housing segment, the charger electrical contacts disposed at a first end of the battery portion opposite the insertion end of the chamber of the cartomizer receiving segment, [d] wherein an outer shell is commonly shared by the battery housing segment and the cartomizer receiving segment; and [e] a cartomizer insertable into the chamber at the insertion end, the cartomizer comprising: [f] a body including a structure configured to hold a vaporizable liquid; [g] a wicking element provided within the body and at least partially in contact with the vaporizable liquid; and [h] a heating element provided within the body in contact with the wicking element and operable to heat the vaporizable liquid, wherein the wicking element is configured to deliver the vaporizable liquid to the heating element, and wherein the entire heating element is disposed between the insertion end of the chamber and the base end of the chamber when the cartomizer is inserted into the chamber such that the outer shell protects the heating element. 15. [pre] A vaporizer comprising: [a] a battery portion comprising: 4

[b] a plurality of charger electrical contacts disposed at a first end of the battery portion; [c] a battery housing segment for housing a battery between the first end of the battery portion and a second end of the battery portion; [d] a cartomizer receiving segment defining a chamber having an insertion end at the second end of the battery portion and distal from the battery housing segment, the chamber further having a base end proximate to the battery housing segment, wherein an outer shell is commonly shared by the battery housing segment and the cartomizer receiving segment; and [e] one or more battery electrical contacts in or proximate the chamber of the cartomizer receiving segment; and [f] a cartomizer insertable into the insertion end of the chamber, the cartomizer comprising: [g] a body including a structure configured to hold a vaporizable liquid; [h] a wicking element provided within the body and at least partially in contact with the vaporizable liquid; [i] a heating element provided within the body in contact with the wicking element and operable to heat the vaporizable liquid, wherein the wicking element is configured to deliver the vaporizable liquid to the heating element, and wherein the entire heating element is disposed between the insertion end of the chamber and the base end of the chamber when the cartomizer is inserted into the chamber such that the outer shell protects the heating element; and [j] one or more cartomizer electrical contacts for connecting with the one or more battery electrical contacts in or proximate the chamber. Id. at 4-6; ’722 patent at 18:33-61; 20:8-42. b. Claims 1 and 8 of the ’981 Patent The ’981 patent is titled “Vaporizer.” FID at 4n.2 citing ’981 patent. Claim 1 of the ’981 patent is an independent claim and claim 8 is dependent from claim 1. Id. at 14. Claims 1 and 8 of the ’981 patent are reproduced below: 1. [pre] A vaporizer comprising: [a] a battery portion having an outer shell and a chamber defined by the outer shell; and [b] a cartomizer having a mouthpiece end and an insertion end disposed opposite the mouthpiece end, the cartomizer comprising: [c] a cartomizer body having a volume defined therein, the volume configured to hold a fluid vaporizable substance, [d] wherein at least a portion of the cartomizer body comprises a translucent material configured to allow viewing of the fluid vaporizable substance, [e] wherein the cartomizer body is configured for insertion into the chamber such that at least part of the volume is positioned in the chamber when the cartomizer body is inserted into the chamber; [f] a heating element and a wicking element within the cartomizer body; 5

[g] an inhalation tube in fluid communication with the heating element and the wicking element; [h] a mouthpiece at or proximate to the mouthpiece end, the mouthpiece in fluid communication with the inhalation tube; and [i] a plurality of cartomizer electrical contacts on an exterior of the insertion end, wherein the plurality of cartomizer electrical contacts is positioned to contact a plurality of battery electrical contacts at a base end of the chamber when the cartomizer body is inserted into the chamber. 8. The cartomizer of claim 1, wherein the plurality of cartomizer electrical contacts is further configured to at least partially compress the plurality of battery electrical contacts when the cartomizer body is inserted into the chamber. Id. at 6-7; ’981 patent at 18:10-37; 18:62-65. c. Claims 1 and 4 of the ’173 Patent The ’173 patent is titled “Vaporizer Apparatus.” Id. at 8 (citing ’173 patent). Claim 1 is independent, and claim 4 is dependent from claim 1 and claim 3. See id. at 190. Claims 1 and 3- 4 of the ’173 patent are reproduced below: 1. [pre] An apparatus comprising: [a] a cartridge comprising [b] a mouthpiece, [c] a storage compartment configured to hold a vaporizable material, and [d] a heater chamber comprising a resistive heating element configured to heat the vaporizable material, wherein the heating of the vaporizable material generates an aerosol comprising the vaporizable material and air passing along an airflow path; and [e] a body comprising [f] a receptacle configured to insertably receive and couple to the cartridge, [g] wherein the heater chamber is disposed within the receptacle when the receptacle insertably receives and couples to the cartridge, [h] wherein the airflow path comprises: [i] an air inlet passage having a first side formed by an exterior surface of the cartridge and a second side formed by an internal surface of the receptacle when the receptacle insertably receives and couples to the cartridge, [j] wherein the air inlet passage is configured to deliver the air to the heater chamber; and [k] a fluid connection in the cartridge, the fluid connection connecting the heater chamber and the mouthpiece. 3. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the cartridge has a proximal end and a distal end opposite the proximal end, wherein the mouthpiece is disposed at the proximal end, and wherein the heater chamber is disposed proximate to the distal end. 6

4. The apparatus of claim 3 wherein the receptacle terminates in a proximal edge, wherein the air inlet passage extends from the proximal edge of the receptacle towards the distal end of the cartridge when the receptacle insertably receives and couples to the cartridge. Id. at 8-9; ’173 patent at 55:28-49; 55:55-64. d. Claims 27 and 32 of the ’123 Patent The ’123 patent is titled “Vaporizer Devices With Blow Discrimination.” Id. at 7 citing ’123 patent. Claim 27 is independent, and claim 32 is dependent from claim 27. See id. at 146. Claims 27 and 32 of the ’123 patent are reproduced below: 27. [pre] A vaporizer device comprising: [a] a cartridge comprising a reservoir configured to hold a vaporizable material, a heater configured to heat the vaporizable material, and a mouthpiece in fluid communication with the heater; and [b] a device body comprising: [c] a cartridge receptacle configured to insertably receive the cartridge; [d] a pressure sensor configured to output sensor readings, [e] wherein a first side of the pressure sensor is exposed to a sealed air flow path and a second side of the pressure sensor is exposed to a device air path open to ambient pressure, [f] the sealed air flow path comprising a channel formed between an interior surface of the cartridge receptacle and an exterior surface of the cartridge, [g] the sealed air flow path passing from an air inlet, through the channel and to the heater and an outlet in the mouthpiece of the cartridge; and [h] a gasket around the pressure sensor, the gasket configured to seal the device air path from the sealed air flow path. 32. The vaporizer device of claim 27, wherein the cartridge comprises the vaporizable material, and wherein the vaporizable material comprises a nicotine formulation. Id. at 7-8; ’123 patent at 49:50-50:3; 50:14-16. B. 19 C.F.R. Part 177 Ruling Request 1. Procedural History On December 3, 2025, NJOY submitted a letter to CBP requesting an administrative ruling pursuant to 19 C.F.R. Part 177, which included three sets of expert declarations and fourteen exhibits. NJOY Email to EOE Branch, dated December 3, 2025. In particular, NJOY “request[ed]… a ruling that a modified version of NJOY’s vaporizer devices and cartridges/pods used with those devices…are not subject to exclusion from entry based on the limited exclusion order…issued by the U.S. International Trade Commission in Investigation No. 337 -TA-1368.” 7

Ruling Request at i. In the same e-mail, NJOY also confirmed that it had begun the process of entering into a non-disclosure agreement with JLI and would provide the Ruling Request to JLI once the agreement had been executed. NJOY Email to EOE Branch, dated December 3, 2025. NJOY provided the EOE branch with a signed non-disclosure agreement with JLI that same day and provided JLI with access to the Ruling Request. NJOY Email to JLI and the EOE Branch, dated December 3, 2025. On December 8, 2025, the EOE Branch had an initial conference call with NJOY and JLI, on which both parties agreed to conduct the Ruling Request on an inter partes basis administered by the EOE Branch. See EOE Email to Parties, dated December 9, 2025. Also, during this initial call, the EOE Branch and the parties discussed scheduling for the inter partes ruling, and after failing to reach agreement on a proposed procedural schedule, the parties submitted proposals to the EOE Branch. See NJOY Email to EOE Branch, dated December 11, 2025; JLI Email to EOE Branch, dated December 11, 2025. On December 29, 2025, after considering the parties’ submissions, the EOE Branch established the procedural schedule for the inter partes proceeding. EOE Branch email to Parties, dated December 29, 2025. On January 21, 2026, JLI provided its response to the Ruling Request, which included three exhibits (collectively, “JLI Response”). NJOY provided its reply to JLI’s Response on January 28, 2026, which included one declaration and twenty-four exhibits (collectively, “NJOY Reply”). On February 4, 2026, JLI provided its sur-reply (“JLI Sur-Reply”) to NJOY’s Reply. The EOE Branch conducted an oral discussion with the parties, for which both parties submitted presentations, on February 23, 2026. 2. The Articles at Issue The articles at issue are described in the Ruling Request as “a modified version of NJOY’s vaporizer devices and cartridges/pods used with those devices.” Ruling Request at i. Specifically, the products for which NJOY requested a ruling are the “New NJOY ACE.” Id. at 1. NJOY describes the product as an “electronic nicotine delivery system…that heat [s] an e-liquid to yield an inhalable aerosol and consists of (1) a ‘Device’ that includes a rechargeable battery and other reusable electronics; and (2) a sealed, pre-filed non-refillable, disposable ‘Pod’ that contains the e-liquid and the heating element for the e-liquid.” Ruling Request at 1. Importantly, NJOY states that the claims subject to the LEO require the product to have a chamber in which the cartridge or pod is inserted. Id. The New NJOY ACE [[ ]] and also has a modified airflow path [[ ]] which further differentiates it from the claims at issue. Id. According to NJOY, the ITC determined that its legacy device, as shown below on the left, satisfied the claim limitations. Id. The New NJOY ACE, as shown below on the right, [[ 8

]] Id. at 1-2. [[ ]] Id. at 2. Additionally, as shown below on the left, the ITC determined that “the space between the Legacy Device and Legacy Pod as satisfying the sealed air flow path comprising a channel formed between an interior surface of the cartridge receptacle and an exterior surface of the cartridge.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). NJOY states that it [[ ]] Id. [[ ]] Id. at 3. 9

II. ISSUE Whether NJOY has met its burden to show that the articles at issue do not infringe the ’722, ’981, ’173, or ’123 patent claims at issue, and thus are not subject to the limited exclusion order issued in the 1368 investigation. See id. at 32. III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK A. Section 337 Exclusion Order Administration The Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of section 337 to determine, with respect to each investigation conducted by it under this section, whether there is a violation of this section. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) and (c). If the Commission determines, as a result of an investigation under this section, that there is a violation of this section, it shall direct that the articles concerned, imported by any person violating the provision of this section, be excluded from entry into the United States unless the Commission finds based on consideration of the public interest that such articles should not be excluded from entry. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1). When the Commission determines that there is a violation of section 337, it generally issues one of two types of exclusion orders: (1) a limited exclusion order or (2) a general exclusion order. See Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. ITC, 474 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Both types of orders direct CBP to bar infringing products from entering the country. See Yingbin-Nature (Guangdong) Wood Indus. Co. v. ITC, 535 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed Cir. 2008). “A limited exclusion order is ‘limited’ in that it only applies to the specific parties before the Commission in the investigation. In contrast, a general exclusion order bars the importation of infringing products by everyone, regardless of whether they were respondents in the Commission’s investigation.” Id. A general exclusion order is appropriate only if two exceptional circumstances apply. See Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1356. A general exclusion order may only be issued if (1) “necessary to prevent circumvention of a limited exclusion order,” or (2) “there is a pattern of violation of this section and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing products.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2); see Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1356 (“If a complainant wishes to obtain an exclusion order operative against articles of non-respondents, it must seek a GEO [general exclusion order] by satisfying the heightened burdens of §§ 1337(d)(2)(A) and (B).”). In addition to the action taken above, the Commission may issue an order under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(i) directing CBP to seize and forfeit articles attempting entry in violation of an exclusion order if their owner, importer, or consignee previously had articles denied entry on the basis of that exclusion order and received notice that seizure and forfeiture would result from any future attempt to enter articles subject to the same. An exclusion order under § 1337(d)—either limited or general—and a seizure and forfeiture order under § 1337(i) apply at the border only and are operative against articles presented for customs examination or articles conditionally released from customs custody but still subject to a timely demand for redelivery. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d)(1) (“The Commission shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action under this subsection directing such exclusion from entry, and upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through the proper officers, refuse such entry.”); id., at (i)(3) (“Upon the attempted entry of articles subject to an order issued under this subsection, the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately notify all 10

ports of entry of the attempted importation and shall identify the persons notified under paragraph (1)(C).”) (emphasis added). Significantly, unlike district court injunctions, the Commission can issue a general exclusion order that broadly prohibits entry of articles that violate section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 without regard to whether the persons importing such articles were parties to, or were related to parties to, the investigation that led to issuance of the general exclusion order. See Vastfame Camera, Ltd. v. ITC, 386 F.3d 1108, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Commission also has recognized that even limited exclusion orders have broader applicability beyond just the parties found to infringe during an investigation. See Certain GPS Devices and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-602, Comm’n Op. at 17, n.6, Doc ID 317981 (Jan. 2009) (“We do not view the Court’s opinion in Kyocera as affecting the issuance of LEOs [limited exclusion orders] that exclude infringing products made by respondents found to be violating Section 337, but imported by another entity. The exclusionary language in this regard that is traditionally included in LEOs is consistent with 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)-(D) and 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).”). Moreover, “[t]he Commission has consistently issued exclusion orders coextensive with the violation of section 337 found to exist.” See Certain Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories, Inv. No. 337-TA-276, Enforcement Proceeding, Comm’n Op. at 11, Doc ID 43536 (Aug. 1991) (emphasis added). “[W]hile individual models may be evaluated to determine importation and [violation], the Commission’s jurisdiction extends to all models of [violative] products that are imported at the time of the Commission’s determination and to all such products that will be imported during the life of the remedial orders.” See Certain Optical Disk Controller Chips and Chipsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-506, Comm’n Op. at 56-57, USITC Pub. 3935, Doc ID 287263 (July 2007). Lastly, despite the well-established principle that “the burden of proving infringement generally rests upon the patentee [or plaintiff],” Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191 (2014), the Commission has held that Medtronic is not controlling precedent and does not overturn its longstanding practice of placing the burden of proof on the party who, in light of the issued exclusion order, is seeking to have an article entered for consumption. See Certain Sleep-Disordered Breathing Treatment Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337- TA-879, Advisory Opinion at 6-11. In particular, the Commission has noted that “[t]he Federal Circuit has upheld a Commission remedy which effectively shifted the burden of proof on infringement issues to require a company seeking to import goods to prove that its product does not infringe, despite the fact that, in general, the burden of proof is on the patent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a given article does infringe. . . .” Certain Integrated Circuit Telecommunication Chips, Inv. No. 337-TA-337, Comm’n Op. at 21, n.14, USITC Pub. 2670, Doc ID 217024 (Aug. 1993), (emphasis in original) (citing Sealed Air Corp. v. ITC, 645 F.2d 976, 988-89 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). This approach is supported by Federal Circuit precedent. See Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. ITC, 899 F.2d 1204, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“Indeed, we have recognized, and Hyundai does not dispute, that in an appropriate case the Commission can impose a general exclusion order that binds parties and non-parties alike and effectively shifts to would-be importers of potentially infringing articles, as a condition of entry, the burden of establishing noninfringement. The 11

rationale underlying the issuance of general exclusion orders—placing the risk of unfairness associated with a prophylactic order upon potential importers rather than American manufacturers that, vis-a-vis at least some foreign manufacturers and importers, have demonstrated their entitlement to protection from unfair trade practices—applies here [in regard to a limited exclusion order] with increased force.”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). B. Patent Infringement Generally Determining patent infringement requires two steps. Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc., 808 F.3d 1313, 1316 (2015). The first is to construe the limitations of the asserted claims and the second is to compare the properly construed claims to the accused product. Id. To establish literal infringement, every limitation recited in a claim must be found in the accused product whereas, under the doctrine of equivalents, infringement occurs when there is equivalence between the elements of the accused product and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Microsoft Corp. v. GeoTag, Inc., 817 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016). One way to establish equivalence is by showing, on an element-by-element basis, that the accused product performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way with substantially the same result as each claim limitation of the patented invention, which is often referred to as the function- way-result test. See Intendis GmbH v. Glenmark Pharms., Inc., 822 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As for the first step above, “claim construction is a matter of law.” SIMO Holdings, Inc. v. H.K. uCloudlink Network Tech., Ltd., 983 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Moreover, the ultimate construction of a claim limitation is a legal conclusion, as are interpretations of the patent’s intrinsic evidence (the patent claims, specifications, and prosecution history). UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co., 816 F.3d 816, 822 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841, 190 L. Ed. 2d 719 (2015)). Although claim construction is a question of law, the consideration of extrinsic evidence may constitute a subsidiary finding of fact. Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841, 190 L. Ed. 2d at 733. “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “In some cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges.” Id. at 1314. In others, courts look to public sources such as “the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.” Id. “To begin with, the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“To take a simple example, the claim in this case refers to ‘steel baffles,’ which strongly implies that the term ‘baffles’ does not inherently mean objects made of steel.”). The context in which a claim term is used also includes the full chain of dependence as well as the remaining suite of claims and the written description. See Inline Plastics Corp. v. EasyPak, LLC, 799 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Since the specification explicitly 12

mentions the ‘alternative’ . . . there can be no debate concerning the application of the doctrine of claim differentiation.”). The second step to establish infringement involves a comparison of the claims, as properly construed, to the accused product, which is a question of fact. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 839 F.3d 1034, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc). We apply this two-step analysis below. IV. ANALYSIS The parties do not dispute any factual questions related to the operation of the articles at issue, and JLI did not contest NJOY’s description of how the articles function throughout the inter partes proceeding. See JLI Response; JLI Sur-Reply; Oral Discussion Transcript. JLI only disputes whether CBP may issue a prospective ruling in this instance under 19 C.F.R. Part 177 and does not present any arguments on whether the articles infringe the claims at issue in the ’722 patent, the ’981 patent, the ’173 patent, and the ’123 patent (collectively, the “Asserted Patents”). See JLI Response; JLI Sur-Reply; Oral Discussion Transcript. A. Whether CBP Can Issue a Ruling Regarding this Matter JLI contends that CBP cannot issue a ruling regarding the New NJOY ACE under 19 C.F.R. Part 177. See e.g., JLI Response. First, JLI argues that without approval from the Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”) the New NJOY ACE is hypothetical and that issuing a ruling is against the sound administration of customs law. Id. at 2-3 citing 19 C.F.R. § 177.7(a). If that argument fails, JLI next contends that CBP cannot issue a ruling for the New NJOY ACE until the Federal Circuit has ruled on NJOY’s appeal of the ITC’s decision. JLI Response at 2. Our analysis of JLI’s arguments are laid out below. a. The New NJOY ACE is not Hypothetical and Issuing a Ruling is Against the Sound Administration of Customs Law JLI argues that the design for the New NJOY ACE is “hypothetical” until NJOY receives FDA approval. JLI Response at 2-3. According to JLI, the FDA has a lengthy approval process, has previously required NJOY to modify the product, still has two other NJOY products pending review, and has only ever approved twenty-three tobacco-flavored e-cigarette products out of all applications. Id. at 8. JLI also argues that issuing a ruling here is against the sound administration of customs law because NJOY cannot legally import the articles without FDA approval. JLI Response at 5- 6. JLI states that CBP has previously declined to issue a ruling involving the classification of drug paraphernalia because the merchandise’s importation was prohibited. Id.; see, e.g., HQ 114939 (February 14, 2000); HQ 041682 (Nov. 26, 2008). JLI maintains that similar to these rulings on drug paraphernalia, issuing a ruling in this matter would “greenlight” NJOY’s importation of the New NJOY ACE despite being prohibited merchandise without FDA approval. JLI Response at 5-6. 13

NJOY asserts that the articles in question are sufficiently finalized and as such are not merely hypothetical articles. NJOY Reply at 6. We agree. While NJOY cannot publicly deploy the New NJOY ACE without FDA approval, a lack of public deployment of a product or a lack of regulatory approval does not render the proposed transaction merely hypothetical. See, e.g. H325116/H325117 (May 27, 2022) (finding that a lack of approval from the Consumer Product Safety Commission did not make the products hypothetical). In H325116/H325117, CBP determined that the question was not whether the products would obtain regulatory approval but whether the redesigned products were still subject to the exclusion order. See H325116/H325117 (May 19, 2021). As explained in that ruling letter: OHD further asserts that we should “decline CGI’s Ruling Request as based on a hypothetical transaction because CGI has failed to establish that its ‘MC’ products’ design and function are finalized.” OHD Response at 14. For example, OHD points out that Chamberlain has not yet obtained regulatory approval for the redesigned products from, for example, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. Id. at 15. We disagree that Chamberlain’s Ruling Request is essentially hypothetical. The question presented in this ruling request is whether the redesigned products are subject to the exclusion order issued in the 1209 investigation due to infringement of the patents at issue. As part of its request, Chamberlain provided samples of articles it intends to import that permitted an evaluation of those sample for OHD to evaluate and argue its position whether the articles in question infringe any of the asserted claims in the Modified 1209 LEO. The administrative record does not provide for an inference that these articles are not sufficiently finalized for evaluation or that Chamberlain is still working on fabrication of its redesigns. Moreover, the Customs regulations make clear that “[t]he application of a ruling letter by a Customs Service field office to the transaction to which it is purported to relate is subject to the verification of the facts incorporated in the ruling letter, a comparison of the transaction described therein to the actual transaction, and the satisfaction of any conditions on which the ruling was based.” See 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(b)(1). Thus, to the extent that modifications are made in the future and imported articles differ materially from the facts incorporated in the ruling letter or do not satisfy the conditions upon which this ruling letter is based, this ruling letter will not apply to that import transaction. Id. at 39. JLI attempts to distinguish the instant case with rulings such as H325116/H325117 on the basis that the articles at issue here are purportedly “‘adulterated’ tobacco products that are expressly prohibited from importation prior to authorization by FDA.” JLI Sur Reply at 1. However, this misses the point. Like H325116/H325117, this ruling letter only takes a position on whether the articles at issue are subject to exclusion pursuant to an exclusion order issued by the Commission. It takes no position as to whether the articles at issue are in compliance with all other regulations, e.g., regulations administered by the FDA, such that entry into the United States would be permitted. An additional distinction is that at the time the drug paraphernalia rulings cited by JLI were issued the products were per se prohibited and inadmissible; here, the products are not per se prohibited but instead their admissibility is contingent upon receiving regulatory approval from the FDA. 14

Nothing in Part 177 requires CBP to wait for approval from a regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over an article before issuing a ruling. See 19 C.F.R. Part 177. If the FDA requires NJOY to materially modify the device prior to approval, then the determination of this ruling will not apply. See 19 C.F.R. § 177.5; see also H324813 (June 3, 2022) (stating that the ruling would only apply to the articles at issue in the ruling request and would not apply to any hypothetical future articles that materially differed from the articles at issue in the case) citing 19 C.F.R. 177.9(b)(1). We disagree with JLI that the EOE Branch would be “greenlighting” the importation of prohibited merchandise should it issue a ruling that the new NJOY ACE does not fall within the scope of the 1368 LEO. If NJOY attempts to import the merchandise not in compliance with other regulations such as FDA regulations, enforcement action may still be taken against the merchandise as restricted merchandise under, e.g., Title 19 of the U.S. Code, as applicable, regardless of any favorable ruling from the EOE Branch that the merchandise is not subject to exclusion pursuant to the LEO. See e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(2)(A) – (B). As noted, the EOE Branch’s ruling is limited to whether the articles at issue are subject to the 1368 LEO. Thus, NJOY’s first argument fails to be persuasive. b. NJOY’s Litigation Before the Federal Circuit Does Not Preclude CBP from Issuing a Ruling Next, JLI argues that CBP cannot issue a ruling for the New NJOY ACE until the Federal Circuit has ruled on NJOY’s appeal of the ITC’s decision. JLI Response at 2. NJOY’s litigation before the Federal Circuit does not preclude CBP from issuing this ruling because the matters at issue before the Federal Circuit and before CBP differ. As recognized in the prior rulings, see e.g., HQ H284032 (April 7, 2017), it has long been the position of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (including its predecessor, the U.S. Customs Service) and the Treasury Department that, to further the sound administration of the Customs and related laws, “persons engaging in any transaction affected by those laws fully understand the consequences of that transaction prior to its consummation[.]” For this reason, CBP “will give full and careful consideration to written requests from importers and other interested parties for rulings or information setting forth, with respect to a specifically described transaction, a definitive interpretation of applicable law, or other appropriate information.” 19 C.F.R. § 177.1(a); see also Proposed Revision Relating to Issuance of Administrative Rulings by Headquarters Office, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 40 Fed. Reg. 2437 (January 13, 1975) and Issuance of Administrative Rulings by Headquarters Office, Final Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 31929 (July 30, 1975) (promulgating this provision of 19 C.F.R. Part 177 as it appears, unchanged, in the current edition of the Customs regulations). “Generally, a ruling may be requested under the provisions of this part only with respect to prospective transactions—that is, transactions which are not already pending before a Customs Service office by reason of arrival, entry, or otherwise.” Id. Additionally, “[n]o ruling letter will be issued with regard to transactions or questions which are essentially hypothetical in nature or in any instance in which it appears contrary to the sound administration of the Customs and related 15

laws to do so.” 19 C.F.R. § 177.7(a). Moreover, “[n]o ruling letter will be issued with respect to any issue which is pending before the United States Court of International Trade, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or any court of appeal therefrom.” 19 C.F.R. § 177.7(b) (emphasis added). NJOY filed its brief with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6), appealing, inter alia, the Commission’s Final Determination (and related Commission Opinion) which resulted in the 1368 LEO. Brief for Petitioner at 8, 24 NJOY, LLC v. ITC, 2025 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 1402 (No. 25-1795) (“NJOY Brief”). Importantly, for purposes of this ruling letter, the appeal to the Federal Circuit involves the Commission’s Final Determination, resulting from the investigation under section 337, that a violation of this section exists based on the legacy products accused and found to infringe the relevant patent claims included in the limited exclusion order. The Commission’s Final Determination whether there is a violation of section 337 by those legacy products involves an issue that is separate and distinct from the administration of the exclusion order by Customs and its authority under 19 C.F.R. Part 177 to determine whether an unadjudicated article may be entered into the United States in light of an exclusion order. This is particularly the case where, as here, the article in question is a new or modified product that allegedly is not subject to exclusion from entry under reasoning and/or facts distinct from those in the underlying investigation. CBP has repeatedly adhered to the position that appealing a Commission Final Determination to the Federal Circuit does not foreclose CBP from ruling on the admissibility of other products that were not adjudicated during the investigation at the Commission. See CBP HQ Ruling H259071 at 8 (December 10, 2014) (“CBP has issued ruling letters during the pendency of appeals at the Federal Circuit that involve a final determination of the Commission because, although the general matter was on appeal, the particular issue before the Federal Circuit [involving the legacy products found to infringe] was not the subject of the administrative ruling.”) (emphasis added); see also CBP HQ Ruling H067500 (August 5, 2009). Since, as noted above, NJOY’s appeal of the Commission’s Final Determination does not involve the articles at issue here, the subject of this ruling request is not an “issue” pending before the Federal Circuit and, consequently, CBP is not precluded under 19 C.F.R. § 177.7(b) from ruling on whether the New NJOY ACE falls within the scope of the 1368 LEO. B. Whether the Articles at Issue Infringe the Asserted Patents JLI does not make any arguments to counter NJOY’s position that the New NJOY ACE does not infringe the claims of the Asserted Patents. See JLI Response; JLI Sur-Reply.1 Nonetheless, we outline and analyze NJOY’s arguments concerning non-infringement, below. 1 We do note that there is a section in JLI’s Sur Reply that is titled “JLI Has Not Waived Any Non-Infringement Arguments.” JLI Sur Reply at 6. However, JLI did not provide any substantive infringement arguments and this section only stated that “any CBP ruling on NJOY’s Request is only binding on ‘all Customs Service personnel,’ 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(a), and would not preclude JLI from seeking enforcement of the exclusion order at the ITC and pursuing infringement claims in district court.” Id. 16

a. The Articles at Issue Do Not Infringe Claims 1 and 15 of the ’722 Patent and Claims 1 and 8 of the ’981 Patent NJOY’s primary noninfringement argument regarding the ’722 patent and the ’981 patent is that the New NJOY ACE [[ ]] recited in the asserted claims. Ruling Request at 45. Claim 1 of the ’722 patent requires, inter alia, a “cartomizer receiving segment defining a chamber” and “wherein an outer shell is commonly shared by the battery housing segment and the cartomizer receiving segment.” ’722 patent at 18:34-36; Ruling Request at 45. Similarly, the ’981 patent requires “a chamber defined by the outer shell” and a “cartomizer body [] configured for insertion into the chamber such that at least part of the volume is positioned in the chamber.” Ruling Request at 55; ’981 patent at 18:11-12, 21-23. NJOY argues that, unlike the legacy device, the cartomizer or Pod for the New NJOY ACE [[ ]] (alteration added). Ruling Request at 45. Specifically, NJOY maintains that [[ ]] Id. (citing Nelson Decl. at ¶ 45) (emphasis in original). This design change, according to NJOY, means that the article does not have [[ ]] described in the asserted claims of the ’722 patent and the ’981 patent. Id. at 46, 56 (citing Singhose Decl. at ¶ 66). For the ’722 patent, therefore, NJOY argues that the device lacks a [[ ]] Id. at 49-50, 53-54. Likewise, for the ’981 patent, NJOY argues that the device does not have [[ ]] Id. at 60. Finally, NJOY argues that the [[ ]] also means that the New NJOY ACE does not meet several other limitations of claims 1 and 8 of the ’981 patent. Id. at 62-63. The FID included various pictures of the legacy NJOY ACE to demonstrate the shared features of both the patented invention and the legacy product, which prove instructive to our instant analysis. FID at 27, 28, 32. 17

Id. at 36, 38. Id. at 50, 53. These photographs demonstrate that the “chamber” in the legacy product consists of an enclosed space that receives the cartomizer similar to two overlapping male and female components. This enclosed space is surrounded by the same outer shell as the battery housing segment and the heating element, and the vaporizable substance is heated within this enclosed space when the pod and the device overlap. NJOY characterizes this as: “[o]ne part ‘receives’ another when it has the other part inserted into itself.” Ruling Request at 45 citing Singhose Decl. at ¶ 63. For the New NJOY ACE, NJOY explains that the “Device” is “the battery portion” and “the cartomizer” is the “Pod.” Id. at 45. There are no contrary arguments provided by JLI. As shown in the figures of the New NJOY ACE, the “Device” [[ ]] Id. at 45 - 46. Thus, as the Device has no [[ ]] we find that the New NJOY ACE does not have a “cartomizer receiving segment” as required by claims 1 and 15 of the ‘722 patent.2 2 As noted in HQ H284032, there are only two instances in which CBP will extend the doctrine of equivalents when administering an exclusion order. HQ H284032 at 26 (“The first is where the Commission found a violation of section 337, during the underlying investigation, through infringement under the doctrine. The second is, in those cases when the Commission has found only literal infringement of the asserted patents, where a respondent identified in an exclusion order fails to show a prima facie case that the doctrine does not apply to its new or modified article under the “function-way-result” or “insubstantial differences” test based on the administrative record before CBP.”). Neither of those instances apply here, and as such, we will not extend the doctrine of equivalents. 18

NJOY further states that the “chamber must include a region that is at least partially enclosed.” Ruling Request at 56 citing Singhose Decl. at ¶ 66; see also, id. at 46. NJOY explains that for the New NJOY ACE, [[ ]] Id. at 56 citing Nelson Decl. at ¶ 17. This is supported by the figures provided by NJOY (reproduced below). Id. [[ ]] Id. NJOY’s interpretation of “chamber” and its factual representation of the New NJOY ACE were not disputed. As such, we further find that the New NJOY ACE does not meet the limitation “chamber defined by the outer shell” in claim 1 of the ‘981 patent. Moreover, while the New NJOY ACE does have a [[ ]] to connect the Pod or cartomizer to the device, as the below pictures demonstrate, the device does not have an [[ ]] Instead, the cartomizer is simply [[ ]] [[ 19

]] Ruling Request at 46. Accordingly, we agree with NJOY that the New NJOY ACE lacks a [[ ]] as required by the claims in the ’722 patent and the ’981 patent, and depicted in the drawings they submitted with this Ruling Request. Consequently, we find that NJOY has met its burden to show that the New NJOY ACE does not practice claims 1 and 15 of the ’722 patent nor claims 1 and 83 of the ’981 patent. b. The Articles at Issue Do Not Infringe Claims 1 and 4 of the ’173 Patent and Claims 27 and 32 of the ’123 Patent Similar to the “chamber” in the ’722 patent and the ’981 patent, NJOY’s argues that the New NJOY ACE [[ ]] described in the asserted claims of the ’173 patent and the ’123 patent. Claim 1 of the ’173 patent describes the “receptacle” as “configured to insertably receive and couple to the cartridge.” Ruling Request at 63; ’173 patent at 55:36-37. NJOY similarly points to claim 1 of the ’123 patent, which requires a “cartridge receptacle configured to insertably receive the cartridge.” Ruling Request at 72; ’123 patent at 49: 56-57. In both instances, NJOY uses this description to define the receptacle as an object or space that can receive something inside itself. See Ruling Request at 63, 72. The New NJOY ACE, as discussed above, [[ ]] Id. at 64. Instead, NJOY states that the Pod or cartridge in the New NJOY ACE is designed to [[ ]] Id. Additionally, NJOY argues that [[ ]] the New NJOY ACE does not meet several other limitations of the disputed patent claims. For example, NJOY asserts that the 3 Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“One who does not infringe an independent claim cannot infringe a claim dependent on (and thus containing all the limitations of) that claim.”) (internal citation omitted). 20

cartridge and the device for the New NJOY ACE [[ ]] as described in the ’173 patent and the ’123 patent. Id. at 66, 68, 75. NJOY also alleges that the claims for both patents describe an air flow path created by placing the cartridge inside the receptacle. Id. According to NJOY, in the New NJOY ACE, the air flow path is [[ ]] Id. Neither the Commission nor the ALJ discussed these specific issues in their analysis of the ’173 patent and the ’123 patent. See Commission Opinion; FID. However, the FID included the below images identifying shared components in both NJOY’s legacy device and the patented invention. See e.g., FID at 154. The ALJ found that these images show that the interaction between the cartridge and the device’s receptacle creates the air flow paths described in the ’173 patent and the ’123 patent. Id. at 126, 163. FID at 154. Id. at 173. 21

Id. Id. at 125. Id. at 126. 22

Id. at 163. The pictures above demonstrate again that the interaction between the legacy NJOY device and cartridge is one of two “male” and “female” components. The receptacle in the device is a space that can receive and couple with the cartridge component similar to the chamber described in the ’722 patent and the ’981 patent. See e.g.,’173 patent at 55:36-37. The cartridge and the device must overlap to create the air flow path that initiates either the heater chamber or the pressure sensor in the ’173 patent and the ’123 patent, respectively. See FID at 124-128, 164. Thus, we agree with NJOY that the New NJOY ACE does not practice these disputed limitations of the ’173 patent or the ’123 patent. As discussed above, the New NJOY ACE has a [[ ]] Furthermore, the air flow paths in the New NJOY ACE are located [[ ]] Consequently, we conclude that NJOY has met its burden to show that the New NJOY ACE does not infringe the asserted claims of the ’173 patent or the ’123 patent. V. HOLDING We find that NJOY has met its burden to establish that the articles at issue do not infringe claims 1 and 15 of the ’722 patent, claims 1 and 8 of the ‘981 patent, claims 1 and 4 of the ’173 patent, or claims 27 and 32 of the ’123 patent. Accordingly, the articles at issue are not subject to the LEO issued as result of Investigation No. 337-TA-1368. The decision is limited to the specific facts set forth herein. If articles differ in any material way from the articles at issue described above, or if future importations vary from the facts 23

stipulated to herein, this decision shall not be binding on CBP as provided for in 19 C.F.R. §§ 177.2(b)(1), (2), (4), and 177.9(b)(1) and (2).
Sincerely,
Alaina van Horn Chief, Intellectual Property Enforcement Branch / Exclusion Order Enforcement Branch CC: S. Alex Lasher Quinn Emanuel 1300 I Street NW, Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 20005 [email protected] 24